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What	have	we	learned	so	far	from	the	government’s
COVID-19	policy?
Paul	Cairney	assesses	government	policy	in	the	first	half	of	2020.	He	identifies	the	intense	criticism
of	its	response	so	far,	encouraging	more	systematic	assessments	grounded	in	policy	research.
In	March	2020,	COVID-19	prompted	policy	change	in	the	UK	at	a	speed	and	scale	only	seen	during
wartime.	According	to	the	UK	government,	policy	was	informed	heavily	by	science	advice.	Prime
Minister	Boris	Johnson	argued	that,	‘At	all	stages,	we	have	been	guided	by	the	science,	and	we	will
do	the	right	thing	at	the	right	time’.	Further,	key	scientific	advisers	such	as	Sir	Patrick	Vallance
emphasised	the	need	to	gather	evidence	continuously	to	model	the	epidemic	and	identify	key	points	at	which	to
intervene,	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	peak	of	population	illness	initially,	then	manage	the	spread	of	the	virus	over	the
longer	term.
Both	ministers	and	advisors	emphasised	the	need	for	individual	behavioural	change,	supplemented	by	government
action,	in	a	liberal	democracy	in	which	direct	imposition	is	unusual	and	unsustainable.	However,	for	its	critics,	the
government	experience	has	quickly	become	an	exemplar	of	policy	failure.
Initial	criticisms	include	that	ministers	did	not	take	COVID-19	seriously	enough	in	relation	to	existing	evidence,	when
its	devastating	effect	was	apparent	in	China	in	January	and	Italy	from	February;	act	as	quickly	as	other	countries	to
test	for	infection	to	limit	its	spread;	or	introduce	swift-enough	measures	to	close	schools,	businesses,	and	major
social	events.	Subsequent	criticisms	highlight	problems	in	securing	personal	protective	equipment	(PPE),	testing
capacity,	and	an	effective	test-trace-and-isolate	system.	Some	suggest	that	the	UK	government	was	responding	to
the	‘wrong	pandemic’,	assuming	that	COVID-19	could	be	treated	like	influenza.	Others	blame	ministers	for	not
pursuing	an	elimination	strategy	to	minimise	its	spread	until	a	vaccine	could	be	developed.	Some	criticise	their
over-reliance	on	models	which	underestimated	the	R	(rate	of	transmission)	and	‘doubling	time’	of	cases	and
contributed	to	a	2-week	delay	of	lockdown.	Many	describe	these	problems	and	delays	as	the	contributors	to	the
UK’s	internationally	high	number	of	excess	deaths.
How	can	we	hold	ministers	to	account	in	a	meaningful	way?
I	argue	that	these	debates	are	often	fruitless	and	too	narrow	because	they	do	not	involve	systematic	policy
analysis,	take	into	account	what	policymakers	can	actually	do,	or	widen	debate	to	consider	whose	lives	matter	to
policymakers.	Drawing	on	three	policy	analysis	perspectives,	I	explore	the	questions	that	we	should	ask	to	hold
ministers	to	account	in	a	way	that	encourages	meaningful	learning	from	early	experience.
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Source:	adapted	from	Cairney.
These	questions	include:
Was	the	government’s	definition	of	the	problem	appropriate?
Much	analysis	of	UK	government	competence	relates	to	specific	deficiencies	in	preparation	(such	as	shortages	in
PPE),	immediate	action	(such	as	to	discharge	people	from	hospitals	to	care	homes	without	testing	them	for	COVID-
19),	and	implementation	(such	as	an	imperfect	test-trace-and-isolate	system).	The	broader	issue	relates	to	its	focus
on	intervening	in	late	March	to	protect	healthcare	capacity	during	a	peak	of	infection,	rather	than	taking	a	quicker
and	more	precautionary	approach.	This	judgment	relates	largely	to	its	definition	of	the	policy	problem	which
underpins	every	subsequent	policy	intervention.
Did	the	government	select	the	right	policy	mix	at	the	right	time?	Who	benefits	most	from	its	choices?
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Most	debates	focus	on	the	‘lock	down	or	not?’	question	without	exploring	fully	the	unequal	impact	of	any	action.	The
government	initially	relied	on	exhortation,	based	on	voluntarism	and	an	appeal	to	social	responsibility.	Initial	policy
inaction	had	unequal	consequences	on	social	groups,	including	people	with	underlying	health	conditions,	black	and
ethnic	minority	populations	more	susceptible	to	mortality	at	work	or	discrimination	by	public	services,	care	home
residents,	disabled	people	unable	to	receive	services,	non-UK	citizens	obliged	to	pay	more	to	live	and	work	while
less	able	to	access	public	funds,	and	populations	(such	as	prisoners	and	drug	users)	that	receive	minimal	public
sympathy.	Then,	in	March,	its	‘stay	at	home’	requirement	initiated	a	major	new	policy	and	different	unequal	impacts
in	relation	to	the	income,	employment,	and	wellbeing	of	different	groups.	These	inequalities	are	list	in	more	general
discussions	of	impacts	on	the	whole	population.
Did	the	UK	government	make	the	right	choices	on	the	trade-offs	between	values,	and	what	impacts	could
the	government	have	reasonably	predicted?
Initially,	the	most	high-profile	value	judgment	related	to	freedom	from	state	coercion	to	reduce	infection	versus
freedom	from	the	harm	of	infection	caused	by	others.	Then,	values	underpinned	choices	on	the	equitable
distribution	of	measures	to	mitigate	the	economic	and	wellbeing	consequences	of	lockdown.	A	tendency	for	the	UK
government	to	project	centralised	and	‘guided	by	the	science’	policymaking	has	undermined	public	deliberation	on
these	trade-offs	between	policies.	The	latter	will	be	crucial	to	ongoing	debates	on	the	trade-offs	associated	with
national	and	regional	lockdowns.
Did	the	UK	government	combine	good	policy	with	good	policymaking?
A	problem	like	COVID-19	requires	trial-and-error	policymaking	on	a	scale	that	seems	incomparable	to	previous
experiences.	It	requires	further	reflection	on	how	to	foster	transparent	and	adaptive	policymaking	and	widespread
public	ownership	for	unprecedented	policy	measures,	in	a	political	system	characterised	by	(a)	accountability
focused	incorrectly	on	strong	central	government	control	and	(b)	adversarial	politics	that	is	not	conducive	to
consensus	seeking	and	cooperation.
These	additional	perspectives	and	questions	show	that	too-narrow	questions	–	such	as	was	the	UK	government
‘following	the	science’	–	do	not	help	us	understand	the	longer	term	development	and	wider	consequences	of	UK
COVID-19	policy.	Indeed,	such	a	narrow	focus	on	science	marginalises	wider	discussions	of	values	and	the
populations	that	are	most	disadvantaged	by	government	policy.
_____________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	British	Politics.
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